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Abstract 
Although Japanese credit associations are nonprofit cooperative financial institutions, they assume the 
same financial functions as regional banks that are stock companies and they could compete with each 
other in a regional market. On the other hand, the governance structures of credit associations tend to 
exhibit weaker discipline than those of regional banks and their performances might be better than 
regional banks for this reason.  
In this paper, we empirically investigated whether the objective functions of credit associations are 
different from those of regional banks considering their different governance structures. As a result, 
although significant differences of profitability of these two types of institutions were not detected, it 
was demonstrated that credit associations can capture a greater share of deposits than regional banks 
and the former are more conservative in risk taking than the latter. From these, there is a possibility 
that Japanese credit associations have different objective functions from regional banks. 
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Introduction 
Japanese credit associations were established for the purpose of facilitating mutual aid among 
members and are one of the nonprofit cooperative financial institutions. However, both credit 
associations and regional banks that are stock companies are classified as regional financial 
institutions and are required to practice region-based relationship banking by the government, and 
their financial functions within a region are almost the same. Thus, these two types of institutions 
could compete with each other in a regional market1. However, cooperative financial institutions, 
including credit associations, have received significant preferential treatments, such as government 
taxation benefits, which is different from regional banks. 
Moreover, the governance structures of credit associations are largely different from those of 
private banks that are stock companies because the qualifications of their investors are restricted to 
regional members and voting rights at meetings, such as a general meeting of representatives, allow 
one vote per member regardless of the amount a member invests. It is often pointed out that the 
governance structures of credit associations tend to exhibit weaker discipline than those of private 
banks in Japan. 
As we will note in section 2, Allen and Gale (2000) mentioned that while the objective of 
commercial banks is profit maximisation, nonprofit financial institutions, which have different, i.e. 
weaker governance structures, incorporate labour expenses in the ordinary profit function2. Granero 
and Reboredo (2005) applied an empirical analysis to reveal that this applies to Spanish financial 
institutions and that savings banks can capture a greater share of deposits and take fewer risks in their 
                                                 
1 Hesse and Čihák (2007) revealed that in systems with a high presence of cooperative banks, weak 
commercial banks are less stable than they would be. Okuma (2017) concluded that cooperative 
financial institutions were more stable than regional banks during the Global Financial Crisis in 
Japan. 
2 Verbrugge and Jahera (1981), Akella and Greenbaum (1988) and Purroy and Salas (2000) analysed 
expense preference behaviour. 
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portfolios3. When we consider both the governance structures of credit associations that tend to be 
weaker and the benefits they receive from the government as mentioned before, it cannot be perfectly 
denied that the tendency of having different objective functions than those of regional banks that are 
stock companies will be found in Japan as well. 
Therefore, the purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate whether Japanese credit 
associations act to maximise the objective functions that are different from those of regional banks. 
Specifically, we empirically investigate the following hypotheses: (1) credit associations can obtain 
greater share of deposits than regional banks, (2) the former are more conservative in risk taking than 
the latter, and (3) the former raise higher profits than the latter. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, explain the analytical method 
and Section 3 describes the survey data. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and Section 5 
presents a summary and conclusion. 
 
Methodology 
Granero and Reboredo (2005) empirically analysed whether the performances of savings banks and 
commercial banks in Spain are different based on the theoretical model of Allen and Gale (2000). We 
also follow this theoretical framework, which is outlined as follows. 
Bank A and Bank B compete with each other in a regional market. Bank A is a commercial 
bank whose objective is profit maximisation and Bank B is a cooperative bank whose corporate and 
governance structure is assumed to yield an organisation in between a capitalist entity and a 
cooperative of workers. Bank A maximises the following expected profit: 
 
ߨ஺ ൌ ݌ሺ ஺ܻሻሺ ஺ܻܦ஺ െ ܴሺܦሻܦ஺ െ ݓܮ஺ሻ,         (1) 
 
                                                 
3 García-Marco and Robles-Fernández (2008) examined risk behaviour in commercial banks and 
savings banks in Spain. 
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where p(YA) is the probability Bank A receives a return YA, DA is the amount of deposit Bank A holds, 
D is the sum of the deposits in a regional market, i.e. D = DA + DB, R(D) is the opportunity cost of 
funds, w is the wage and LA is the volume of labour of Bank A. 
On the other hand, Bank B maximises the following objective function that includes labour 
expenses into Equation (1)4: 
 
ܷ஻ ൌ ߨ஻ ൅ ߠ݌ሺ ஻ܻሻݓܮ஻,            (2) 
 
where θ is the (positive) expense preference parameter. 
From the first-order conditions of Equations (1) and (2), the following statements can be 
derived5. 
(a) Cooperative financial institutions like Bank B can receive a higher volume of deposits than 
commercial banks like Bank A, i.e. DB > DA and the former are more conservative on investing risk 
assets than the latter, i.e. YA > YB. 
(b) Cooperative financial institutions can obtain a higher expected payoff level, i.e. UB > πA. 
(c) When the expense preference parameter is not too large, the expected profits of cooperative 
financial institutions are higher than those of commercial banks. 
In the present paper, the following three equations are estimated as in Granero and Reboredo 
(2005) to test whether the above statements (a)–(c) are applicable to Japanese regional financial 
institutions: 
 
ܦ݁݌݋ݏ݅ݐ௜௧ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଵܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜௧ ൅ ܿଶܣݏݏ݁ݐ௜௧ ൅ ܿଷܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ௜௧,       (3) 
                                                 
4 Fonteyne (2007) mentioned that a cooperative bank might resemble a worker cooperative rather than 
a consumer cooperative. 
5 See Granero and Reboredo (2005) for details. 
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ܴ݅ݏ݇௜௧ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଵܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜௧ ൅ ܿଶܣݏݏ݁ݐ௜௧ ൅ ܿଷܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ௜௧,         (4) 
 
ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ௜௧ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଵܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜௧ ൅ ܿଶܣݏݏ݁ݐ௜௧.              (5) 
 
Subscript i refers to financial institution i, and subscript t refers to year t. Deposit means whether 
a financial institution can obtain large amounts of deposits and is calculated by dividing deposits by 
total assets. Risk is a proxy variable on the aggressiveness of the financial institution’s risk taking and 
is reported by two measures: Risk1 is calculated by dividing loans and bills discounted by total assets 
and Risk2 is calculated by dividing stock by total assets. Profit is profitability as measured by Return 
On Assets (ROA) and Return On Equity (ROE). ROA is calculated by dividing current term net profit 
by total assets and ROE is calculated by dividing current term net profit by total net assets6. 
Dummy is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when financial institution i is a credit 
association and a value of 0 when it is a regional bank. Asset is total assets and is a proxy for financial 
institution size. Asset is converted into a natural logarithm. 
If the objective functions of credit associations are different from those of regional banks and 
statements (a)–(c) are applied to Japan, then the coefficients of Dummy in Equations (3) and (5) will 
take positive signs and in Equation (4) it will take a negative sign. 
 
Data 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables of estimation models from Eqs. (3)–
(5), which are separated into credit associations and regional banks. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
                                                 
6 Average balances are used as total assets and total net assets in the denominators. 
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The mean of Deposit of credit associations is about 4% larger than for regional banks. Credit 
associations can capture a greater share of deposits. Both the means of Risk1 and Risk2 of credit 
associations are about 20% for the former and about 1.15% for the latter less than those of regional 
banks. In both lending and stock investment, it can be said that credit associations are more 
conservative with respect to risk taking. 
The means of ROA and ROE of credit associations are about 0.02 for the former and about 0.2 
for the latter larger than those of regional banks. In both ROA and ROE, credit associations can realise 
higher profitability although their differences are not too large. That is, when focusing on the means, 
Deposit, Risk, and Profit all satisfy statements (a)–(c) in the former section. These will be tested by 
regression analyses in the next section. 
The data used in the present paper are derived from Nikkei Needs. Data absent from Nikkei 
Needs were supplemented by the ‘Analysis of Financial Statements of All Banks,’ edited by the 
Japanese Bankers Association, and by ‘Financial Statements of All Credit Associations,’ edited by the 
Consultant of Financial Books Co., Ltd. 
 
Estimation Results 
In this section, we discuss the estimation results for Eqs. (3)–(5). The estimation results for Eqs. (3) 
and (4) are presented in Table 2. Standard errors are calculated as White heteroscedasticity-consistent 
errors. 
  
Table 2. Estimation Results for Deposit and Risk 
 
In the estimation results for Deposit, all of the coefficients of Dummy take significantly positive 
signs at the 1% level. The fact that credit associations can gather a greater share of deposits than 
regional banks is also found here, which is the same tendency as in the means shown in the previous 
section. 
In addition, in the estimation results for Risk1 and Risk2, the coefficients of Dummy take 
significantly negative signs at the 1% level in all cases. In both lending and stock investment, credit 
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associations take fewer risks than regional banks. These are also consistent with the tendency of the 
means observed in the previous section7. 
Next, the estimation results for Eq. (5) are shown in Table 3. These standard errors are also 
White heteroscedasticity-consistent errors. 
 
     Table 3. Estimation Results for Profit 
 
In the estimation results for both ROA and ROE, all of the coefficients of Dummy take positive 
signs but are insignificant. Although the tendencies that credit associations can raise a little larger 
profitability than regional banks were found on both the means of ROA and ROE in the previous 
section, significant differences are not detected here. The profit margins of interest rates have become 
much smaller due to the long-standing ultra-low interest rate policies taken by the Bank of Japan. 
Therefore, the profit rates of financial institutions have been lower as a whole and the differences of 
them among financial institutions have become smaller. This might be the reason for these results. 
From these, although significant differences are not observed in profitability, it can be revealed 
that credit associations can receive deposits easier than regional banks and the former are more 
conservative in risk taking than the latter, which are consistent with the theoretical predictions in 
Section 2. Thus, there is a possibility that Japanese credit associations also have the objective functions 
as in Eq. (2), which are different from those of regional banks due to the special characteristics of their 
governance structures. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
7 We used cash and due from banks (Safe) as the proxy on investing in risk-free assets instead of Risk, 
contrary to the variable on aggressiveness of risk taking. Consequently, the coefficients of Safe 
take significantly positive signs at the 1% level, contrary to the coefficients of Risk. Thus, credit 
associations are more conservative in risk taking.  
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Japanese cooperative financial institutions assume almost the same financial functions as regional 
banks in a region and they could compete with each other. On the other hand, the former are 
institutions for mutual aid among members and whose governance structures tend to exhibit weaker 
discipline than regional banks8. Thus, there is a possibility that their objective functions are different. 
In this paper, we select Japanese credit associations and empirically investigate whether their objective 
functions are different from the ordinary profit function. 
Although the means of profit rates of credit associations are a little larger than those of regional 
banks, significant differences could not be detected by regression analysis. This might reflect that the 
differences of profitability among financial institutions have been small due to the ultra-low interest 
rate policies that have been applied in Japan for a long time. 
On the other hand, it was also revealed that credit associations can capture a greater share of 
deposits than regional banks and the former take fewer risks than the latter. These two points are 
consistent with theoretical predictions in the case that we assume that credit associations and regional 
banks have different objective functions. 
Judging from these, there is a possibility that Japanese credit associations tend to maximise the 
objective functions that incorporate labour expenses in the profit function as demonstrated in foreign 
previous studies9. If the governance structures of credit associations become stronger, then their 
objective functions will be nearing those of regional banks and the benefits that credit associations can 
enjoy, which were revealed in the present paper, might be weaker. It might be necessary to reconsider 
what the governance structures of credit associations should be like as they and regional banks could 
compete with each other and, unlike regional banks, they receive preferential treatments such as 
taxation benefits. 
 
                                                 
8 Laeven and Levine (2009) showed that the same regulation has different effects on bank risk taking 
depending on the bank’s corporate governance structure. 
9 Yamori (1998) found that Japanese credit associations employing bureaucrat-managers held more 
employees than those that did not. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Regional Banks   
Deposit 840 88.343  6.211  68.835  187.691  
Risk1 840 65.497  7.881  45.412  131.773  
Risk2 832 1.575  1.010  0.092  7.757  
ROA 840 0.211  0.192  −1.619  1.097  
ROE 840 4.120  4.795  −42.752  24.276  
Credit Associations   
Deposit 2,147 92.390  2.975  52.683  98.099  
Risk1 2,147 45.658  9.161  6.384  72.614  
Risk2 2,147 0.417  1.247  0.001  21.656  
ROA 2,147 0.235  3.652  −3.829  168.811  
ROE 2,147 4.342  80.193  −109.077  3703.356  
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Table 2. Estimation Results for Deposit and Risk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Deposit Deposit Risk1 Risk1 Risk2 Risk2 
              
Dummy 0.025*** 0.025*** −0.201*** −0.201*** −0.009*** −0.009*** 
 
(7.183) (7.176) (−39.920) (−39.915) (−11.443) (−11.401) 
Asset −0.008*** −0.008*** −0.001 −0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(−8.093) (−8.099) (−0.777) (−0.786) (5.437) (5.433) 
ROA −0.000  −0.000 0.000  
 
(−0.633)  (−0.459) (0.467)  
ROE  0.000 0.000** −0.000** 
  (0.215) (2.531) (−2.117) 
Constant 1.001*** 1.001*** 0.676*** 0.676*** −0.004 −0.004 
 (64.681) (64.672) (24.936) (24.937) (−1.146) (−1.155) 
    
Observations 2,987 2,987 2,987 2,987 2,979 2,979 
R-squared 0.189 0.189 0.506 0.506 0.171 0.171 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1   
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Table 3. Estimation Results for Profit 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES ROA ROE 
      
Dummy 0.176 3.427 
 
(1.190) (1.053) 
Asset 0.078** 1.633** 
 (2.186) (2.092) 
Constant −0.924* −19.756* 
 (−1.779) (−1.730) 
   
Observations 2,987 2,987 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
. 
